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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
WALKER BANK & TRU;ST
COMPANY, a, corporation
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
EUGENE R. THO'RUP,
Defendant and App.ellant,
IDA VfOLA THORUP LAYTON,
Defendant.

Case No. 8691

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ST ATEMEN·T OF FACTS
Respondent as Administrator of the Estate of
Nettie N. Thorup, deceased, filed its complaint
against Eugene R. Thorup and Ida Viola Thorup
Layton. The complaint is a simple complaint to quiet
title in plaintiff. :This complaint alleges plaintiff's
appointment as Administrator, and that deceased
was owner of two parcels of realty described at the
time of her death, and that defendants are heirs
of said deceased, and that plaintiff is entitled to
possession of said realty, and prays that title be
quieted in plaintiff as representative of the Estate
of Nettie N. Thorup.
1
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Defendants answered that deeds were duly
executed by Nettie N. Thorup to defendants on the
26th Day of July, 1950, and duly delivered to defendants during the lifetime of Nettie N. Thorup.
She died on February 23, 1955. Plaintiff replied
to the answers simply by admitting defendant, Eugene R. Thorup, is in possession of the property,
and denying other allega~ions of defendants' answers.
At the beginning of the trial plaintiff and
respondent herein introduced the two Warranty
Deeds dated as aforesaid, naming Nettie N. Thorup
as grantor (Ex. 1) one to Eugene R. Thorup as
grantee, and the other to Mrs. Layton as grantee.
(Ex. 2) Attorney for plai11tiff announced thereupon
that he intended to prove by expert testimony that
the two deeds are forgeries. Defendants thereupon
objected to such procedure as not within the pleadings. ( Tr. 2) The trial judge overruled the objection
without an opportunity for defendants' attorney
to be heard, or present authorities supporting the
objection, and ordered plai11tiff to proceed.
E11dorsements on Utah Power & Light checks
payable to Nettie N. Thorup 'vere introduced, and
Percy Goddard, who had picked two checks with
endorsements and evidently had enlarged photographs of them n1ade. He testified to the differences
in the endorsements and the signatures on the deeds.
2
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These differences were principally in the "T" in
Thorup, and the "N" in Nettie, and concluded, therefore, that the signature on the deeds were forgeries.
The defference in the "T" consisted, he said, in
1naking the " T" in one stroke in the two endorsements, and in two strokes on the deeds. This testimony, even in the face of testimony of Louis Thorup,
who, as plain tiff's witness, testified that sometimes
the deceased wrote the "'T" one way and sometimes
in two separate strokes (Trans. -6-Rec. 26) The
"N", said Goddard, in the two endorsements has the
second loop lower than the first, but on the deeds
they were about the same height. It further appeared
that plaintiff's vvitness, Louis Thorup, had obtained
the endorsements at night (Transo 20) with his
of the cases (Trans. 23) and cashed
help in 90
all but one at Fisher's Brewery. He also testified
that Mrs. Thorup was nearsighted and sometimes
signed the check without using her glasses (Tr. 24)
Defendant Eugene R. Thorup testified that he
was personally present on July 26, 1950, and saw
Mrs. Thorup sign said deeds in bright daylight vvith
her glasses on. Also that under instruction of James
l\11. Carlson, Mrs. Thorup delivered the deed (Exhibit 1) to him. Also that James M. Carlson was
present and saw her sign the deeds, and she acknowledged the execution to and before him.
James M. Carlson testified to preparation of
1

ro
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the deeds after two interviews with Mrs. Nettie
N. Thorup, who had called him for interviews. Also
he testified she, Et1gene R. Thorup and he had together measured the property conveyed to Eugene
on the second visit after examination of abstracts
delivered to him by 1\frs. Thorup. On the date the
deeds bear Mrs. Thorup called James M. Carlson
and said to bring the deeds i11 the daytime on a
bright day. That afternoon she, in bright daylight
with her glasses on, slowly signed the two deeds
and handed Eugene's to him after acknowledgment
as appears on the deed. (Tr. 84)
On Motion for a New Trial defendant presented twelve other checks payable to Nettie N. Thorup
and apparently endorsed by her and cashed by Louis
Thorup at Fisher Brewing Company. The twelve
checks clearly showed that the "T" was more often
than not signed in two separate strokes, and the
"N" had the two loops the same height. Clearly witness Goddard had picked out for comparison two
endorsements only, which were different from the
deed signatures, and not l(nO"\ving whether Louis
Thortlp in effect signed or guided Mrs. Thorup's
hand or not on his night visits. Goddard sat in a
jury seat all the time Louis Thorup testified.
Defendant filed an Affidavit of Bias on objection to Judge Van Cott's hearing· the Motion for a
New Trial. This the Judge overruled, ( Rec. 117) ,
4
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and Judge VanCott, Jr., insisted on his hearing the
Motion for a Nevi Trial, and denied same after
arguments and presentation of the filed Affidavits
in support thereof and presentation of twelve different endorsements of Mrs. Thorup. (Rec. 118)
POINT'S RELIED UPON
POINT I.
THAT THE PLEADINGS ARE A SIMPLE EQUITY
CASE, BUT THE EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE WAS
PERMITTED AND ERRONEOUSLY TAKEN AS IF IT
WERE A FRAUD LAW CASE TO CANCEL DEEDS.
POINT II.
THE PROCEDURE AS IF IT WERE A FRAUD
CASE TOOK DEFENDANTS BY SURPRISE.
POINT III.
THAT THE CLEAR PREPONDERANCE OF THE
EVIDENCE IS IN FAVOR OF THE VALIDITY OF APPELLANT'S DEED, AND PLAINTIFF'S TESTIMONY
DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT THE
DEEDS WERE FORGERIES.
POINT IV.
THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT REFERRING THE CAUSE ON AFFIDAVIT OF BIAS
TO ANOTHER JUDGE.
POINT V.
THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL MADE
ON GROUNDS OF SURPRISE, WRONGFUL PROCEDURE AND NEW EVIDENCE.
5
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POINT I.
THAT THE PLEADINGS ARE A SIMPLE EQUITY
CASE, BUT THE EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE WAS
PERMIT'rED AND ERRONEOUSLY TAKEN AS IF IT
WERE A FRAUD LAW CASE TO CANCEL DEEDS.

In support of appellant's contention may we cite
the following authorities:
Strong v. Strong, 140 Pac. (2d) 386, (Cal.)

This was a suit to quiet title. Defendant's wife attempted to prove fraud under general allegations of
ownership. Court held: (at page 389, 9-10)
"Any rights that she might have to the
cancellation of the deed or to the declaration
of a constructive trust are entirely equitable,
(Rocha v. Rocha,, 197, Cal. 396, 240 P. 1010;
F,arrar v. Steenberger, 159 Pac. 707; Freligh
v. McGr,aw, 272 P. 791; Walsh Equity 492),
and it is settled that such rights cannot be
established in an action to quiet title when
the pleadings contain merely general allegations asserting defendant's ownership and
denying that of plaintiff."
Ostrom v. Jackson, 127 S.W. (2d) 987. The
Court held:
''A deed cannot be set aside on grounds
not pleaded."
74 C.J.S., page 75:

"* * * The issues of fact which arise for
determination in a suit to quiet title are those,
and only those, which are properly presented
by the pleadings * * *''
6
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Lel,and v. Bourne, 41 U. 125; 125 Pac. 652:
A suit to quiet title in an equitable action.
"This is an equity case to quiet the title
to real property. In such a case both parties
have a right to invoke our judgment upon the
whole evidence. If in such a case in our judgment the findings are clearly against the
weight of the evidence, it is our duty to vacate the1n and substitute others. In this case
in our judgment the findings are manifestly
against the great weight of the evidence, and
for that reason cannot be permitted to stand.

* * *"
Fares v. Urban, 46 U. 609, 151 Pac. 57.
Here a simple complaint to quiet title.
Plaintiff introduced evidence of adverse possession. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff on
appeal contended the case one in law, in effect
an ejectment, and court is bound by findings,
if any evidence to support them.
"If the court try the case as an action
in equity, the case must be considered as such
by us.''
Appellant was and is in possession of the property under claim under the deed.
74 C.J.S., page 53:
"Possession and action at law. As a general rule, a holder of legal title to lands must,
in order to maintain an action to quiet title
or remove a cloud, be in possession of the land
when the action is instituted since, where defendant is in possession, the remedy at law
by action of ejectment affords a plain, adequate, and complete remedy."
7
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POINT II.
THE PROCEDURE AS IF IT WERE A FRAUD
CASE TOOK DEFENDANTS BY SURPRISE.

Appellant had no warnings by pleadings that
plaintiff under the pleading would present checks,
of which l1e knew not, for comparison, and had no
opportunity to present rebuttal testimony by a writnig expert or other check endorsement.
·see Affidavit in Support of Motion. (p. 115-6)
Rule 9 (3) (b) of Rules of Civil Procedure
states:
"In all averments of fraud or mistake,
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity."
POINT III.
THAT THE CLEAR PREPONDERANCE OF THE
EVIDENCE IS IN FAVOR OF THE VALIDITY OF APPELLANT'S DEED, AND PLAINTIFF'S TESTIMONY
DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT THE
DEEDS WERE FORGERIES.

Respondent's testimony in this regard rests
solely on the so-called expert that signatures as endorsements on two checks are different in some
respects from the signature on deeds. As against
such is the testimony of two witnesses present on
July 26, 1950, and sa'v the actual signing, acknowlment and delivery of the deed to appellant. Also,
in refutation of the Goddard testin1ony is the testi8
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mony of Louis Thorup, who hurriedly obtained the
so-called endorsements at night, sometimes without
Mrs. Thorup's use of glasses, CTr. 20), and that
sometimes she signed one way sometimes another
\Vay (Trans. 16) the letters on which Goddard based
his opinion of difference.
Also, Appellant was and is in possession of the
property.

Leland v. Bourne, 41 U. 425, 125 Pac. 652, at
657:
''This is an equity case to quiet the title
to real property. In such a case both parties
have a right to invoke our judgment upon the
whole evidence. If in such a case in our judgment the findings are clearly against the
weight of the evidence, it is our duty to vacate
them and substitute others. In this case in our
judgment the findings are manifestly against
the great weight of the evidence, and for that
reason cannot be permitted to stand. * * *"

In Re Helin's Estate, 55 U. 572, 188 Pac. 633:
Possession under a deed regular upon its
face carries with it presumption of regularity
notwithstanding it was not recorded until
after death of grantor.
Ogg v. Gunderson, 168 Pac. (2d) 793:
"'The primary test of the validity of a
deed was whether grantor intended to make
a present transfer, and if such was his intention, the title of the property thereby passed
irrevocably to the grantee."
9
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POINT IV.
THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT REFERRING THE CAUSE ON AFFIDAVIT OF BIAS
TO ANOTHER JUDGE.

See Affidavit. (p. 115)

Rule 63 (b) of Rules of Civil Procedure.
Judge VanCott, Jr., just denied the sufficiency
of the Affidavit and denied the request that the
cause be referred to another Judge. He, therefore,
violated the said Rule 63, which provides:

''* * * If the judge against who the affidavit is directed questions the sufficiency of
the affidavit, he shall enter an order directing that a copy thereof be forthwith certified
to another judge (naming him) of the same
court or of a court of like jurisdiction, which
judge shall then pass upon the legal sufficiency of the affidavit. If the judge against
whom the affidavit is directed does not question the legal sufficiency of the affidavit, or
if the judge to whom the affidavit is certified
finds that it is legally sufficient another judge
must be called in to try the case or determine
the matter in question.
Coll v. Lo1£,es, Inc. 76 F. Supp. 872.
POINT V.
THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING
AP'PELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NE\V TRIAL lVIADE
ON GROUNDS OF SURPRISE, WRONGFUL PROCEDURE AND NEW EVIDENCE.

This point involves the discussions under Points
I, II, and III.
10

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Affidavits were presented of two witnesses,
namely: Helen Heins, a close neighbor of Nettie N.
Thorup, and Bertha H. Morris, a friend of the whole
Thorup family. Helen Heins swears that Nellie N.
Thorup before she became ill stated to her that she
had given or left the home to "Gene", so he should
have a home.
Bertha H. Morris swears that Nettie N. Thorup
told her that: (p. 112)
''she had a lawyer make out papers giving the
home property to 'Gene', as she called him.
She said this home is his."
Also, appellant's attorney presented, as indicated in an Affidavit in support of Appellant's Motion, twelve endorsements of Nettie N. Thorup,
whcih showed that Nettie N. Thorup signed them
with a "T" and an "N" as in the questioned deed
in refutation of Goddard's testimony and conclusions based on differences between her writing on
two singled out checks and appellant's deed. If
Goddard had picked the twelve check endorsements,
his testimony and conclusion would have to have
been different.
There is no evidence in the record to justify a
finding that the signature on the deed in question
is forged.
See: People v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. 590, 28 Pac.
597 at 8.
Here only evidence is (as in the case at bar)
11
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of an expert who by comparison was of the opinion
a certain check was signed by defendant. Held this
evidence does not prove forgery.
State v. Swan, 411 Pac. 750, (Kans.)
:To prove forgery plaintiff must prove
document signed without authority.
State v. Jones, 20 Pac. (2d) 614, (Utah)
To prove forgery it must be shown that
name of another was signed without authority, and expert evidence by comparison not
enough.
Redington v. Woods, 45 Cal. App. 45, 200 Pac.
1054.
Held: There is no presumption from a
difference in handwriting.
26 C.J.S., Section 34, page 663:
"It is not essential to the validity of a
deed that the grantor should actually affix
his signature thereto with his own hand, and
the source or nature of its execution is immaterial if he adopts such signature or acknowledges as his own."
And, of course, there is no pleading to authorize a finding of forgery.
We submit that the Findings and Judgment
should be set aside and a decree entered in favor of
Appellant.
Respectfully submitted
ELIAS HANSEN
J. GRANT IVERSON
JAMES M. CARLSON

Attorneys for Appellant
12
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